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Learning from Libya, Acting in Syria
Abstract
The international community has reached an impasse. The violence committed by Syrian
President Assad's government against opposition forces, who have been calling for
democratic reform, regime change, and expanded rights, has necessitated a response from
the international community. This article explores various ways the international
community could respond to the crisis in Syria and the consequences of each approach. It
compares the current calamity in Syria to the crisis in Libya and examines the international
community's response to the violence perpetrated by Qaddafi's regime. It further analyzes
reports, primarily from the UN and news sources, about the ongoing predicament in Syria.
The article concludes that the international community should proceed with achieving a
ceasefire via dialogue but must begin by conveying newly imposed sanctions that affect the
Sunni merchant class and thus threaten Assad's grip on power to make that dialogue more
effective. World leaders should also identify a Syrian leader who could replace Assad, who
must be removed from power because of the crimes against humanity that have been
committed by his regime. Western states must accept that they will have to engage
peacekeeping forces in the region to aid the transition of power in Syria.
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Abstract
The international community has reached an impasse. The violence committed by Syrian President Assad's government against opposition forces,
who have been calling for democratic reform, regime change, and
expanded rights, has necessitated a response from the international community. This article explores various ways the international community
could respond to the crisis in Syria and the consequences of each
approach. It compares the current calamity in Syria to the crisis in Libya
and examines the international community's response to the violence perpetrated by Qaddafi's regime. It further analyzes reports, primarily from
the UN and news sources, about the ongoing predicament in Syria. The
article concludes that the international community should proceed with
achieving a ceasefire via dialogue but must begin by conveying newly
imposed sanctions that affect the Sunni merchant class and thus threaten
Assad's grip on power to make that dialogue more effective. World leaders
should also identify a Syrian leader who could replace Assad, who must be
removed from power because of the crimes against humanity that have
been committed by his regime. Western states must accept that they will
have to engage peacekeeping forces in the region to aid the transition of
power in Syria.

Introduction
In March 2012, the UN reported that over eight thousand people had died
as a result of the conflict in Syria.1 As monitors and journalists have
increasingly communicated the atrocities that have been committed in
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Syria—by the government of Assad against protesters—world leaders have
felt increasingly compelled to act. Western states and NATO have been
faced with a few questions: whether or not to intervene, how to intervene,
and to what extent. The situation in Syria is similar to the situation in
Libya that precipitated the NATO military intervention to create a no-fly
zone, which was authorized by the UN Security Council on March 17,
2011.2 Various members of the international community, particularly
Russia and China, which both have interests at stake in Syria, have
expressed opposition to any kind of military intervention. Russia also has
its last major military base outside of the former Soviet Union in the Syrian port of Tartus. The removal of the Assad regime could lead to the end
of access to this facility. Russia has also been blocking sanctions against
Syria in the UN Security Council in order to protect its oil interests and
arms sales in Syria, which were affected in Iraq and Libya after dictators
were overturned.3 However, Aleksandr Konovalov, President of the Moscow-based Institute of Strategic Analysis, described Moscow's interest in
Syria as based less on economic factors than political factors "because a
new Middle East is now taking shape" following the Arab Spring protests,
"and Russia is definitely not indifferent to how it emerges."4 Syria is Russia's last foothold in the Arab world; the removal of Assad and his Alawite
regime will curb Russia's influence in the region.
Beyond the implications of launching an air campaign opposed by other
members of the international community, the United States has been
reluctant to intervene militarily in Syria because Russia has supplied
Syria with advanced air defense systems. And, according to U.S. Central
Command chief General James Mattis, there is belief in the United States
that the Syrian government possesses chemical and biological weapons.
There is also fear that the United States will be involving itself in a messier conflict than Libya.5
It is arguable that the conflict in Syria is distinct from the conflict in Libya
and thus does not beget the same response. For example, the rebel operations in Syria have not been near the scale of the rebel operations in Libya,
and Libya did not have sectarian divisions comparable to those in Syria.
Additionally, besides that Syrian government's tanks and artillery have
outmatched the rebels' rifles and homemade bombs, the Syrian regime
controls an army that is unified and committed to forcefully suppressing
the protests and thus cannot be compared to other states such as Tunisia
and Libya where the militaries helped topple unpopular leaders.6, 7
Another significant factor that differentiates the crisis in Syria from the
former crisis in Libya is that the Syrian government continues to be
backed by its strong and long-standing alliances with Iran and Russia.
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World leaders have been urging Assad to order a ceasefire. Because of the
sectarian divisions in the Arab world, Syria's alliance with Iran, and the
absence of unanimity in the international community concerning how to
respond, the Syrian crisis has not been equivalent to the Libyan crisis, and
thus a direct military intervention such as a NATO-imposed no-fly zone
has not been seriously pursued. The approach to resolving the crisis in
Syria has been to continue pushing Assad to order a ceasefire.

The Arab Spring in Libya
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was by all accounts eccentric. His strongman
rule of Libya lasted for forty-two years, beginning when he overthrew
King Idris I with a group of revolutionary officers on September 1, 1969.
In theory, Gaddafi's government was based on a system of direct democracy, but in fact the people's committees that held power consisted of
regime loyalists. And, though Libya was relevant because of its oil, the
state was not strategically important to other countries because Gaddafi
never sought the support of a powerful patron like Russia, China, or the
United States, and Gaddafi upset many major powers to the extent that
few were interested in standing up for Gaddafi.
Gaddafi started making enemies in the international community after the
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, which
killed 270 civilians, and which the U.S. blamed on Libya. A similar bombing of a French airliner took place over Niger in 1989, killing 170 civilians.
In response, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed sanctions on Libya, including a ban on military sales, air communications, and
certain oil equipment.8
The Security Council lifted the sanctions in 2003 when Gaddafi's regime
took formal responsibility for the bombing, paying compensation and
handing over the suspected attackers. Gaddafi was welcomed back to the
international community after he promised to renounce terrorism; Libya
was voted into the UNSC as a nonpermanent member in October 2007.
France and the United States abstained from voting on the resolution
because they did not want to endorse Libya's candidacy but they also did
not want to block it.9 The U.S. representative said the U.S. sanctions on
Libya would remain in full force because there were still serious concerns
about Libya's "rejection of democratic norms and standards, its irresponsible behavior in Africa, its history of involvement in terrorism and—most
importantly—its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and their means
of delivery."10
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Gaddafi lost the esteem of the international community again when the
Arab Spring protests spread to Libya. Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, called for an international investigation into
what she referred to as "widespread and systemic attacks against the civilian population [that] may amount to crimes against humanity."11
The pro-democracy rebellions in opposition to authoritarianism, which
had been triggered across the Middle East by a single man's protest
against his treatment by the police, spread to Libya in February 2011.
Gaddafi fought the uprisings with an unprecedented level of violence,
rekindling enmity in the international community.
Consistently, Gaddafi denied the gravity of the crisis and his loss of control, claiming on February 24, 2011, for example, that the protestors had
been fueled by milk and Nescafé spiked with hallucinogenic drugs.12 And
on February 25, Gaddafi disregarded the thousands of protestors demonstrating—demanding better government services, denouncing corruption,
and burning buildings—and, referring to himself in third person during a
speech in Tripoli's Green Square, said, "the people love him."13
The severity of the situation became more apparent to the international
community on February 26, when Gaddafi invited foreign journalists to
the capitol. They reported seeing bread lines, sections of the city in open
defiance, the government painting over anti-Gaddafi graffiti, snipers and
antiaircraft guns firing at unarmed civilians, citizens afraid to talk to the
press, and bodies being removed by security forces from streets and hospitals and taken to an unknown location.14 As a result, on February 27,
the UN Security Council passed sanctions against Gaddafi and members
of his family, and voted to refer Gaddafi to the International Criminal
Court (ICC). Concurrently, Gaddafi persisted in denying the demonstrations against him, saying, "My people love me. They would die for me."15

NATO Campaign over Libya
In the first days of the uprisings, rebel forces seized control of several
eastern oil cities. Gaddafi's forces regained control of the territories in
March 2011 and the rebels found themselves outgunned and outnumbered.16 At the time, Gaddafi's air force was attacking anti-Gaddafi forces.
Since the crisis began, air power had been Gaddafi's greatest advantage,
allowing his forces to move ammunition and supplies along Libya's long
coast and preventing rebels from using bases and planes they had captured in the east. On March 8, 2011, NATO sent surveillance aircraft to
Libya and soon after, NATO began its quest for approval from the Arab
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League to enforce a no-fly zone, to force Gaddafi's warplanes from the sky
and remove the advantage.17 Simultaneously, Britain and France were
pursuing a UN resolution to permit enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya.18
Discussion in the international community about a no-fly zone was
heavily contested. The African Union (AU) had communicated a "deep
concern" about the violence in Libya, which they acknowledged posed "a
serious threat to peace and security in that country and in the region as a
whole."19 The AU expressed solidarity with Libya but rejected "any foreign military intervention, whatever its form."20 Gaddafi "should not kill
his people," said Sam Kutesa, the Ugandan foreign minister, "[but] ought
to look at reforms and legitimate demands of his people. "we do not want
foreign interference … we think that there should be an African solution to
this."21
Where NATO and the EU take into account Russia's disapproval of military intervention, the organizations can easily disregard the AU because it
does not have any heft in the international community. None of the AU
member states are on the permanent Security Council. Furthermore, considering NATOs headquarters in Brussels is about 1300 miles from Tripoli and AU headquarters in Addis Adaba is about 2300 miles away, from
a geographic standpoint, NATO and Western Europe have a more substantial interest in Libya.
Initially Western countries and NATO said they would not intervene militarily without approval from regional organizations such as the Arab
League, approval from the AU, and a clear mandate from the Security
Council.22 However, on March 12, the Arab League and Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) requested the UNSC to impose a no-fly zone over Libya,
which paved the way for President Obama and the majority of the Security Council to argue for the use of force to protect civilians in Libya.23

Division in the Security Council
On March 17, the Security Council passed resolution 1973, which authorized member states to take "all necessary measures" to protect civilians,
which was diplomatic code for a call to military action. Ten states voted in
favor and five states—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Germany—
abstained from voting on the resolution, which demonstrated the lack of
support in the international community for Gaddafi's regime. The
abstaining states expressed that they did not want to get in the way of
adoption of the resolution, but that there were too many unanswered
questions, such as how it would be enforced and by whom, and what the
limits of the engagement would be.24
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Manjeev Singh Puri, India's ambassador to the UN, and Maria Luiza
Ribeiro Viotti, Brazil's ambassador to the UN, insisted that there ought to
be a political process to end the conflict. "We must take the greatest care
to ensure that our actions douse the flames of conflict instead of stoking
them," said Viotti. "We are not convinced that the use of force as provided
for in operative paragraph 4 of the present resolution will lead to the realization of our common objective—the immediate end to violence and the
protection of civilians."25 Chinese Ambassador Li Baodong said, "There
must be no attempt at regime change or involvement in civil war by any
party under the guise of protecting civilians."26 While Baodong's statement was more direct, if it were sincere, China would have voted against
the intervention, by abstaining, they gave tacit approval.
Despite the reservations of some critics, supporters of the resolution were
glad it was passed. Nigerian Ambassador U. Joy Ogwu explained that the
grave and dire situation in Libya necessitated the resolution: "The current
state of affairs leaves an indelible imprint on the conscience and compels
us to act."27

Losing Support
On March 12, in concert with the GCC, the Arab League requested that the
UNSC impose a no-fly zone over Libya. However, soon after the NATO
campaign commenced, the Arab League expressed its disapproval. On
March 20, Amr Moussa, the Arab League Secretary General, said that he
would call a league meeting to reconsider approval by the Arab League of
the Western military intervention. "What is happening in Libya differs
from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone," said Moussa. "And what we want
is the protection of civilians and not the shelling of more civilians."28
It was clear to many at the outset that creating a no-fly zone involved taking out Libya's air defenses, including air bases, runways, and helicopter
gunships. It also meant that Gaddafi's ground forces would be vulnerable
to strikes if they shelled towns and that Libyan naval vessels would be
subject to ground attacks and strikes if they were used for bombardment.
The violence that would be involved in creating a no-fly zone was not a
secret. That the Arab League was upset about the violence that was
involved in the NATO intervention demonstrated a shallow understanding of the action that was required to create such a zone—if not outright
denial—and undermined the effort. The wavering support from the Arab
League was significant because the integrity and legality of the intervention was already being challenged.29
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Challenging the NATO Intervention
Even before the resolution had been approved, the legality of the intervention had been put to question. The allegation was that the Security
Council and NATO had intervened in a civil war, not genocide, and since
Libya had not threatened its neighbors or any other country, the Security
Council was in violation of its own charters. Critics also pointed out that
NATO, by taking the rebel side in a civil war, had become an armed service provider for the UN and other allies, thus straying from its core mission to protect its members' territory and population. Additionally,
because violence was simultaneously being perpetrated in many other
countries such as Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria—where Western powers
were not intervening militarily—some accused the West of a double standard, and asserted that the intervention supposedly intended to protect
dissidents was actually intended to protect oil interests.

The Arab Spring in Syria
The uprising in Syria commenced in March 2011 in the southern city of
Daraa, where about fifteen children had been arrested and reportedly tortured for writing on a wall the well-known slogan of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt: "The people want the downfall of the regime." Citizens
carried out a peaceful protest, demanding the release of the children. The
protesters also called for democracy and freedom. Like in Libya, the government responded with violence, opening fire on protesters marching
through the city after Friday prayers on March 18, 2011. The initial crackdown failed to dispel the unrest, and the government has continued to
respond to the anti-government protests with violence for over a year.30
As in Libya, the protesters in Syria have demanded that their leader step
down. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has not only stated that he has
had no intention of stepping down, but he has also rejected allegations
that Syrian security forces have committed crimes against humanity. That
being said, Assad has offered some concessions and promised reform, but
whatever promises he has made are overshadowed by continued violence
and as of the penning of this article, he is yet to come through on the
promises or give any reason to believe that he will in the future. The situation in Syria had deteriorated rapidly since February 2012, with one UN
report indicating "the death toll often exceeds 100 civilians a day, including many women and children."31 Rami Abdel Rahman, head of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, cited activists on the ground saying,
"Two rockets are falling a minute on average."32 According to monitoring
groups, crimes committed by Assad's security forces include but are not
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limited to killings, torture, rape, and imprisonment.33 As of March 13,
2012, the death toll from the crackdown by Assad's security forces was
over eight thousand, according to the UN.34 "The nature and scale of
abuses committed by Syrian forces indicate that crimes against humanity
are likely to have been committed since March 2011," said Navi Pillay, the
top human-rights representative in the United Nations. She also said that
inaction by the international community had "emboldened" Syria's government to continue subjecting Syrian civilians to overwhelming force
and violence.35

Libya Scenario in Syria
As previously mentioned, Syria and Libya are distinct cases. Yet, the situation in Syria is similar to the situation in Libya that precipitated the
NATO intervention considering that the citizens have been protesting
poverty, lack of democracy, and corruption, and their protests are being
violently suppressed by a leader, and thus begging for a response from the
international community to interrupt the killings of citizens.36 To demonstrate consistency and refute allegations of operating on a double standard, the West should intervene again in the unfolding crisis in Syria.37 In
November 2011, U.S. State Department Assistant for Near Eastern Affairs
Jeffrey Feltman insisted that the Arab League put pressure on the Syrian
regime. "The regime must be judged by its actions, not by its words," said
Feltman. "The killing has continued unabated. And we urge our Arab
partners to condemn the regime and assume a greater role in building
international pressure, including at the UN."38 Condemnation of the Syrian regime and endorsement of military intervention by the Arab League
would not enable the UN to pass a resolution and commit NATO to
enforcing a fly zone, but it might put more pressure on the international
community, in particular Russia and China, to be more engaged and move
forward with a unilateral response.
However for the time being, there is an abundance of international opposition to any kind of military intervention in Syria. In November 2011,
NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who had expressed
approval of NATO's work for the UN in the Libyan crisis, said that NATO
would not act in Syria. "NATO has no intention whatsoever to intervene in
Syria. I can completely rule that out," he said.39 Micah Zenko at the Council on Foreign Relations has said that could change when the situation in
Syria is portrayed as a major humanitarian crisis in the media; until then,
the international community lacks a decision-forcing point to compel
action.40
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In February 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon tasked Kofi Annan
with ensuring a ceasefire. Annan met with Assad soon after to discuss a
ceasefire. Assad responded to Annan, sounding like Gaddafi, saying that
political dialogue could not succeed in his country while "armed terrorist
groups" are operating, which has been taken as indication that the military operation and violence will continue.41
Kofi Annan, the UN–Arab League special envoy to Syria, said on March 8,
2012, that he rejected any foreign intervention in Syria, and that any further militarization of the crisis would only make the situation worse. "We
have to be careful that we don't introduce a medicine that is worse than
the disease," said Annan. "We don't have to go very far in the region to
find an example of what I'm talking about." He added, "The situation in
the country is extremely serious for the Syrian people and the region, and
I think we should not forget the possible impact of Syria on the region if
there is any miscalculation."42 Annan noted that the UN General Assembly had published a resolution stating that any intervention should be
Syrian led and Syrian owned.43
While Russia and China have expressed opposition to the violence in
Syria, insisting on a ceasefire, they have steadfastly opposed foreign
intervention because it will ultimately lead to regime change, and both
countries have interests at stake in the current regime. Russia and China
also both have interests at stake in the country that are threatened by
instability. Syria is a longstanding ally of Russia, a purchaser of Russian
arms, and home to a Russian naval base. China depends on the region for
oil. Western diplomats cited that Russia has been using its close
relationship with Syria to put pressure on Assad. And Russia condemned
the violence in Syria in its own draft resolution introduced in the Security
Council. However, Russia left out from their draft, provisions that
Western countries declared non-negotiable so it seemed the draft was
presented just to save face.44 The fact is China and Russia will not support
an armed intervention.

Distinguishing the Situation in Syria from That in Libya
Though on an abstract level, the circumstances in Syria are similar to the
circumstances in Libya that precipitated the NATO intervention, the Syrian crisis should not receive the same response. The Arab League, Russia,
China, France, and Morocco have expressed that they would not support
military intervention in Syria and are pursuing initiation of dialogue
between Damascus and the opposition.45, 46 Furthermore, Syria is rife
with sectarian divisions—74 percent of the population is Sunni, and the
significant minorities, Christians, Alawites, and non-Sunni Muslims each
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make up about 10 percent. Smaller minorities are the Druze in the mountains and the Kurds mainly in the northeast. The Druze people are
described as an isolated community of village and mountain dwellers who
are loyal to the country, which governs their land.47 The Kurds are an ethnic minority in the mountainous region of Kurdistan, which stretches
across Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Syria. The Kurds have
often been subjected to discrimination and harassment by the Syrian government. Kurds are not acknowledged by the Syrian government and
have been denied basic human rights.48 Kurds are committed to democratic reform and a smooth transition of power in Syria, and the Kurdish
youth are actively engaged in the protests in Syria.
In the early 1900s, the Ottoman-backed Sunni majority held power in
Syria. The fractious Alawite minority originally seized power from the
Sunni via a military coup in the late 1966 after the birth of the Baath party
in Syria in 1947, which strengthened the Alawites by causing significant
fissures within the Sunni majority. In 1970, then air-force commander
and Defense Minister General Hafez al-Assad led a bloodless military
coup that ended the string of coups. Assad was capable of managing the
Alawite sect and wisely built patronage networks in the Druze and Christian minorities as well as Sunni military and business elites, which facilitated his rise to power. The Assad regime also suppressed the religiously
conservative Sunnis. Despite obstacles such as an insurgency against the
state in 1976 led by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, power has been consolidated among Syrian Alawites for over forty years.49
Though the Alawite party is historically fractious, the community is aware
that the first indication of splintering among the Alawites in the military
or state could lead to a Sunni-led coup and reversal of power. The Alawites are also cognizant of the role of patronage in their rise to power and
have strategically put many Christians in key leadership posts to secure
the support of that community, though the Alawites dominate key intelligence, military, and economic leadership posts.
Given the tension that exists between sects in Syria, arming the opposition could lead to "a catastrophe even larger than the one that exists
today," according to French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe.50 "The Syrian
people are deeply divided, and if we give arms to a certain faction of the
Syrian opposition, we would make a civil war among Christians, Alawites,
Sunnis and Shiites," said Juppe. It is the divisions in the Syrian opposition that have prevented them from forming a unified force that the international community could support. President Assad belongs to the
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Alawite sect, a small, obscure branch of Shiism. Assad has concentrated
power in the hands of his family and other members of the Alawite sect,
which also makes up the majority of the Syrian security forces.51

Syria and Iran
The pivotal difference between Libya and Syria is Syria's alliance with
Russia, which has, and will continue to do everything within its power to
prevent a military intervention. Another significant alliance is with Iran.
Iran is a powerful state in the region that has been at odds with the United
States since the ouster of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi during the
Islamic Revolution in 1979. Iran suppressed a prodemocracy movement
in 2009, has supported militant groups such as Hamas and Hizbollah,
and has pursued a nuclear program despite orders from the UN to halt the
program.
In mid-February 2012, U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham proposed breaking
up the Syrian-Iranian alliance.52 However, attempts to break up the alliance between Syria and Iran could push Iran harder to produce a nuclear
weapon.53, 54 U.S. Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen pointed out in
March that "attacks on Syria now could also create a 'domino effect' that
could lead to a hot war with Iran, which considers Syria a client state."
She said, "I worry the Syria operation may be harder because of its tie-ins
to Iran and what will Iran do militarily."55 However, Syria could equally
consider Iran a client state since the Assad regime enjoys acting as the
bridge between the Shiites and the Sunnis. In general, Graham may have
been overstating the relevance of the alliance since Iran is only capable at
this time to support the Syrian regime with military and intelligence assistance; the alliance that deserves more attention and that is more impactful is the alliance between Syria and Russia.
Rather than trying to break up Syria's alliance with Iran or Russia, the
international community should find a way to use the alliances to its
advantage during negotiations. A resolution to the crisis where all actors
walk away feeling that they got what they wanted would be a step toward
building diplomatic relations between Western states and the Arab states,
and would likely be a more sustainable solution. For example, leaders
from Western states, Russia and Arab states could meet with the Assad
regime in unison so everyone feels involved. The objective should be the
defense of human rights therefore the discussion should be focused on
developing relationships as well as sharing of information and resources.
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Iran Is Gaining Ground through the Arab Spring
Some thought the fraudulent reelection of Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad in June 2009 would ignite a revolution in Iran. Tehran did
experience violent street protests, unseen for a decade, after the votes
were counted; however, the protests did not amount to anything comparable to the Arab Spring protests. The revolt in Iran was brutally
repressed. Compare this with Egypt's successful revolution in 2011, which
ignited violent protests in Algeria and Yemen, and drove the king of Bahrain to offer concessions and money to his citizens to deter protests.56 And
then in 2011, Libya, like Egypt, saw its leader toppled. In this context, it is
easy to see why Syrians have been inspired by the successful revolutions,
and have been protesting with resilience for over a year. The instability in
Syria has posed a threat to Iranian influence in the region, especially in
Lebanon and Gaza as Syria is the conduit for Iran's influence in the
region. However, the Arab Spring protests for example in Bahrain have
provided Iran an opportunity to limit Saudi and U.S. influence.
In general the uprisings in the Arab world have threatened the United
States' influence in the region. Despite the fact that the protests are fueled
by the desire for democracy and more freedoms, the United States is not
gaining allies in the region, and its influence there may be waning. While
governments are being overturned and replaced, the United States is
withdrawing its forces. National Post reporter Peter Goodspeed wrote,
"The U.S. and Israel are witnessing their influence and power deteriorate
in the Middle East as the Arab Spring robs them of old allies and shatters
old assumptions."57 While the United States' loss is not necessarily Iran's
gain, the United States' loosening grip of power in the region presents an
opportunity for Iran to build partnerships and forge the groundwork for
alliances.
While the United States might be losing influence regionally, Iran is
gaining influence. For example, the United States toppled Iraq's Saddam
Hussein in 2003, which benefited Iran since Tehran had sought to do the
same thing during the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s.
Without Saddam Hussein in office, Iran has been able to enhance its
influence in Iraq and the Middle East as a whole. Since U.S. troops were
withdrawn from Iraq at the end of 2011, Iran has been more successful in
influencing the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad. Iran has
pitched the protests as being to their advantage. Ramin Mehmanparast,
spokesmen for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, said at an academic
conference in November 2011, "The fall of dictators in the Middle East
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and Africa means a loss of a foothold for the U.S. and Israel. The
Americans are bewildered and confused in their decisions and behavior in
the face of regional revolutions."58
The United States and Britain responded to the threat posed by Iran's
expanding influence with words of warning. In March 2012 at a joint news
conference, U.S. President Obama and British Prime Minister David
Cameron issued a stern warning to Iran. Obama said, "Tehran must
understand that it cannot escape or evade the choice before it. Meet your
international obligations or face the consequences. The window for solving this issue diplomatically is shrinking." Regarding the violence in Syria,
Cameron said monitors have been sent to Syria's borders to record the
crimes. He said, "No matter how long it takes, people should always
remember that international law has got a long reach and a long memory."59 The United States has responded to the threat of expanding Iranian influence by tightening sanctions, employing covert attacks against
Iran, and frequently deploying a second carrier strike group to the Persian
Gulf.60

Options for Intervention
Ivo Daalder, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, announced in November
2011, when Assad's government had already been committing acts of violence against Syrians for close to a year, that "there has been no planning,
no thought, and no discussion about any intervention into Syria."61
Daalder said, "There needs to be a demonstrable need, regional support,
and sound legal basis for action. It's those three things we need to look for
before we even think about the possibility of action. None of them apply in
Syria."62
The international community will not resort to militarization of the crisis
in Syria. However, Assad's regime has resisted resolving the calamity
through peaceful political dialogue despite urgent requests from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.63 The international community must
respond and explore options to push Assad to a ceasefire; as Anwar
Bunni, a human-rights lawyer in Damascus, said, "[Assad's] regime will
continue to kill if nobody stops it."64
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An Alternative Approach: Coercing a Ceasefire
via Negotiations
The international community can coerce a ceasefire to end violence in
Syria through negotiations with Assad's regime. For these negotiations to
be effective, Western countries need to identify what the Syrian government values, and apply appropriate pressure in these strategic areas such
that Assad loses power.65 For example, Assad's clout in Syria depends on
economic favoritism, bribery, and support from stakeholders in the capitol, so economic pressure and loss of support in the capital could push
Assad to a ceasefire.
World leaders could work to drive an economic wedge between the regime
and stakeholders in Syria through sanctions. Sanctions slowed economic
growth in Syria in 2011, when most U.S. exports to Syria were barred,
assets belonging to the state security apparatus were frozen, and European imports of oil—making up 20 percent of the Syrian economy—were
barred. As Syria receives more sanctions from the international community, it should become more apparent that Assad's regime is unable to
keep peace and maintain the economy, which could compel Assad to
order a ceasefire.66 States would have to impose sanctions individually,
because Russia is likely to veto any effort by the United Nations. The long
co-opted Sunni merchants have resisted supporting the uprising in Syria
because they have a lot to lose economically. However, if the economies of
Sunni merchants were impacted by sanctions, they would likely be more
willing to pressure Assad.67
An alternative approach is win-win negotiations. This approach requires
recognizing that all the parties involved have different interests and priorities, and the key would be to identify the solution that gives each party
what it values most at the least cost to the other parties. For instance, on a
basic level: Assad's interest is power, the oppositions' interest is democracy, and the international community's interests are democracy and stability. An ideal solution would be to persuade Assad to adopt democratic
values so that the opposition's demands were met and Assad maintained
power. Given Iran's and Russia's friendship with Syria, Assad might be
more easily convinced to embrace democratic values if the other two
countries embraced them simultaneously. The likelihood of convincing
Iran or Russia to collaborate with Western powers—much less embrace
democratic values—is minimal, but Iranian leaders might acquiesce if
they perceived that the international community needed their support to
be effective, especially since Iran craves to be recognized as a regional
power.68
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The optimistic approach is currently being pursued between diplomats
and finance ministry officials from Arab states, the European Union, the
United States, and others, behind closed doors under the banner "Friends
of Syria." The purpose of the talks is to keep pressure on Assad to end the
violence in Syria. Juppe said, "Our meeting is itself a message: the Syrian
regime must understand that it cannot continue its repression with impunity, and refuse the political transition laid out under the Annan plan and
expected by the Syrian people."69
The downside to this approach is that it is highly unlikely that Iran and
Syria will collaborate in any meaningful way with the United States, especially since the United States has demonstrated a lack of respect for
human rights by supporting abusive regimes in Bahrain, Rwanda, Saudi
Arabia, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Equatorial Guinea. Furthermore, attempts
to collaborate with Syria and Iran could be inefficient and costly. While
Tehran and Damascus have a strong relationship, neither has had an
interest in relations with the United States. Since the end of the Cold War,
Syria and Iran have collaborated in the development of ballistic missiles,
arming of Hizbollah and Hamas, and challenging the U.S. military following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 in fear that either country might
become a target of the "War on Terror." Furthermore, Jubin Goodarzi,
professor of international relations at Webster University in Geneva,
Switzerland, wrote:
"Syria and Iran are the two parties most responsible for spoiling
U.S.-backed peace efforts between Arabs and Israel in order to
promote their own Arab and Islamic interests. For the United
States, they were also the most troublesome countries during the
U.S. intervention in Iraq because they aided, abetted or armed
insurgents."70
Goodarzi also pointed out that since 1979 Syria and Iran have "[thwarted]
the regional goals of the United States, Israel and Iraq."71 However,
according to Haytham Manna, the leader in exile of the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change in Syria (NCBDCS), Russia has
voiced support for democratic changes in Syria and turning power of
Syria's future over to Syrians themselves. While Russia continues to
oppose the use of force by Assad's opponents, Abdul-Aziz al-Kheir, a
spokesman for the NCBDCS said that Russia's position has been changing
since February and "particularly fast over the past two weeks."72 The
progress is slow but significant.
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To be the dominating voice at the table during negotiations or dialogue
about a ceasefire, the international community must speak in a united
voice, acting in defense of human rights abuses, rather than one or a few
countries pushing their agendas forward in order to limit the influence of
other countries in the region. The international community must also
have a viable threat to Assad's and Ahmedinejad's power. The most powerful weapon would be to remove investment in the oil sector, the revenues from which both Syria's and Iran's economies rely on. Syria's
economy has suffered from political unrest, violence, and international
sanctions and is threatened in the long term by issues such as foreign
trade barriers, declining oil production, and high unemployment.73 Similarly, Iran's economy is burdened with an inefficient state sector, reliance
on the oil sector, and unemployment—"underemployment among Iran's
educated youth has convinced many to seek jobs overseas, resulting in a
significant 'brain drain.'"74
The European Union adopted an oil embargo against Iran in January
2012 in response to its nuclear program, and banned all new oil contracts
with Iran. The U.S. also issued sanctions with the intention to apply political pressure on Iran to come back to the negotiating table. On February 3,
Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei referred to the sanctions
as "painful and crippling" yet the sanctions have not yet provoked action.
Iranian officials have assured the public that they will prevail in spite of
the sanctions. Since nuclear programs are symbols of power and national
security, it is likely Iran will accept a great extent of economic pain to
move forward with nuclear research.75 Likewise, despite reports that
Syria's financial reserves have been halved as a consequence of international sanctions, and according to French Foreign Affairs Minister Alain
Juppe, Syrian authorities "continue to actively seek alternative routes to
get around these sanctions."76

Military Intervention
Another option is to endorse military intervention, which would upset
many members of the international community. Currently some countries
such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait continue to support arms being
funneled to the opposition but the efforts are in vain. As previously mentioned, the Syrian military is united and committed to forcefully suppressing the protests so it is highly unlikely that domestic opposition
forces will be able to beat Assad's army.
If the West had an appetite for ground intervention and supported opposition forces, the possibility of toppling Assad and his regime is greater.
The regime could be replaced with a democratic regime. Syria is predomi96
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nantly a Sunni state, so Sunni leadership would be well received by the
majority of the population. However, the election of a Sunni would also
potentially trigger severance of ties or even conflict with Iran, which is a
Shia-majority state.77 And if the intention of military intervention is to
defend human rights, then the leader should be a person who prioritizes
human rights. However, as said by Russian authorities, the Syrians
should be in control of their future, with the support of the international
community.
Despite the opportunity costs of military intervention, the benefit of
installing Sunni leadership would be the possibility of Syria's forging alliances with Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Turkey is a Sunni state, and is striving to be a leader in the Middle East. The opportunity to build a
relationship with Turkey is a real possibility given that Turkey has been
working to develop a relationship with Syria since before the crisis
erupted. Turkey is one of the destinations for Syrian refugees, the others
being Jordan and Lebanon. At the time of this penning, the Turkish government had built eight tent cities and one temporary housing city as
accommodation for the incoming Syrian refugees.78 Turkey immediately
opened its doors to thousands of Syrian refugees as soon as Assad
unleashed violence against protesters, and Turkey has led an international political campaign to end the atrocities.79 The toppling of Assad,
the installation of Sunni leadership, and the development of ties with
Sunni countries such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia could lead Syria to
become a more democratic state.

Conclusion
Discussions about Assad's ouster have been increasing among opposition
leaders within Syria as well as in the international community.80 Though
most states in the international community oppose the violence being
committed by Assad's regime against the opposition, the international
community has been at an impasse. Toppling Assad is not simple because
of the sectarian divisions in Syria, complications introduced by Syria's
alliance with Iran, and Russia and China's opposition to military intervention in Syria.
In addition, the opposition is fractious, deeply divided by sects and incongruent goals. The opposition has suffered from the resignations of key
members such as Haitham Maleh, who is respected for his work on promoting human rights and democracy in Syria.81 These two factors—a global impasse and a weakening opposition—have provided some relief to
Assad. Nevertheless, as foreign-affairs expert Emile Hokayem, an analyst
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at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Bahrain, has said,
"Assad's power is steadily eroding amid a crumbling economy, diplomatic
isolation and an insurgency now schooled in sabotage and roadside
bombings."82
The international community should continue pressing Assad through
dialogue to enforce a ceasefire. To gain an edge in the conversation, new
sanctions should be communicated at the outset of the dialogue. Simultaneously, the international community should identify individuals from
the opposition, such as Haitham Maleh, who could replace Assad if he
were ousted. An acceptable replacement to Assad should have internationally recognized human-rights credentials because the Alawite community is uneasy about the emergence of new Sunni leadership, which the
international community fears might lead to propagation of violence
against Alawites and other groups supporting the regime; a messy transition of power could lead to an ethnic cleansing. Thus, the leadership that
replaces Assad's regime must be able to keep peace and maintain stability
given the sectarian divisions in Syria and the region, which is an issue that
has not been discussed enough in the international community.
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